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Abstract 
After establishing an ethical religion of his own, 
Kant explores the functions of different aspects 
of traditional or “historical” religions.  Since the 
moral religion takes priority over any other 
historical religion, dogmatic beliefs and 
practices could possibly undermine Kant’s true 
ethical aim of religion.  Prayer and other similar 
rituals, not a part of “true religion”, represent 
mankind’s feebleness in seeking out moral 
conceptions.  Although Kant claims prayer can 
serve as a useful element in his greater theology, 
I argue that his analysis offers little to pure 
religion and only accounts for the prevalence of 
prayer historically.  The psychological 
phenomenon Kant deems a weakness in man 
requires some worldly manifestation in order to 
actualize moral duty.  Ritualistic practices fulfill 
this requirement yet also have the ability to 
mislead one away from their true moral 
obligations.  One must tread lightly when 
performing such rituals and not lose focus on 
moral growth.  So, all of the traditional practices 
of religion such as scriptural interpretation and 
intercessory prayer must only act as a means 
toward the actualization of moral imperatives.  I 
conduct an analysis of these means to conclude 
that they are unnecessary in Kant’s pure, self-
evident, religion.  Further, I critique Stephen R. 
Palmquist’s argument for the apparent 
usefulness of prayer as a way of becoming 
worthy of God’s goodness. 
The foundation of Kant’s second 
Critique, practical reason, gave him the 
necessary tools to construct a moral religion.  
As the religion was further developed 
throughout his work, Kant was able to establish, 
as practically necessary, an immutable divine 
being.  The aseity of the divine judge in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conjunction with the certainty and autonomy of 
the moral law made all ritualistic practices that  
claimed to serve God seem futile.  For most, 
prayer is a way of pleading to God and/or 
evading responsibilities.  Under Kant’s 
depiction of an immutable God, it is easy to see 
why prayer would seem not to have a function 
at all.  Indeed, Kant is hypercritical of prayer 
used in the popular notion and even goes so far 
as to condemn it as a detrimental practice 
opposing “true religion”.  However, prayer is 
not completely dismissed from Kant’s theology.  
He develops a philosophy of prayer which 
makes use of ritualistic practices within the 
constraints of his “true religion”.  Although 
Kant’s views on the usefulness of prayer offer 
no greater understanding of his religious 
framework, they are sound within the bounds of 
that framework nonetheless.  I intend to argue 
this by first expositing the way in which Kant 
incorporates prayer into his theology and then 
illuminating the apparent reasons behind 
prayer’s usefulness.  Stephen R. Palmquist gives 
an argument in favor of the role of prayer in 
Kant’s philosophy to which I will offer a 
critique. 
 To understand prayers’ place in Kant’s 
theology, we must first briefly examine his 
religion in transcendental terms.  Just as in 
Kant’s epistemology, religion is seen through a 
“transcendental perspective.”  As subjects, we 
actively interpret passive objects of the world.  
This alone, Kant believes, provides us with 
justification behind our perceptions.  In 
theological terms, “pure rational religion” stems 
from our actively determining passive objects of 
religion.  These objects are presented to us as 
categorical imperatives.  From this formulation 
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arise the necessary conditions for the possibility 
of an empirical religion but also, as Kant points 
out, the possibility for an opposition to that 
religion.  Kant expresses that it is the “pure 
religion” alone that holds priority with the 
empirical (historical) religion subservient to it.  
There exists a “grey area” where each religion 
overlaps; historical religion incorporates 
doctrines of pure religion (Palmquist, 586).  
There is an area, however, where historical 
religion does not incorporate or promote pure 
religion yet is still held as a religious doctrine 
by followers.  Thus, in transcendental terms, the 
empirical element diverts attention away from 
pure religion i.e., away from morality. 
 Hence prayer, an element of historical 
religion, potentially poses a problem to pure 
religion.  Furthermore, prayer, as stated above, 
seems impossible, given that it aims to 
manipulate an unchangeable God.  Kant gives a 
simple proof to show that “God acts in no way 
but freely. Nothing has any influence on him, so 
as to be able to move him to act in any 
particular way and not otherwise” (Kant, 426).  
This way, traditional prayer would seem to have 
no place in Kant’s philosophy. 
 Pure religion takes priority over 
empirical religion, because it is presented to us 
as certain where other “services of God” are not: 
“It is self-evident that the moral service of God 
pleases him directly” (Kant: “Religion Within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason”, 196).  We 
have no sound basis to assert that other rituals or 
practices would do the same since they are not 
presented to us as an imperative.  However, this 
does not mean that historical religion is 
completely useless. Kant claims that historical 
religion can actually act in service of the true 
religion but only because of human frailty:   
 
…because of the natural need of all 
human beings to demand for even the 
highest concepts and grounds of reason 
something that the senses can hold on to, 
some confirmation from experience or 
the like, some historical ecclesiastical 
faith or other, usually already at hand, 
must be used (Kant: “Religion Within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason”, 142). 
 
It is clear that the empirical element which all 
humans need to grasp the concept of morality is 
not specified.  This is because all empirical 
elements are themselves not universal and 
therefore are arbitrary.  According to this 
classification, prayer is then a useful mechanism 
which fulfills this need. 
 Since the empirical element satisfies our 
natural need to seek out the concept of morality 
in the world there must exist a particular 
relationship between the two.  Kant claims that 
not just any experience can fulfill this need.  
One must use “great reserve and caution” when 
attempting to draw the correct moral principle 
out of an experience.  Otherwise, one could 
misconstrue God’s end or aim.  When analyzing 
prayer as an experience in this light, Kant 
creates a dichotomy between formal prayer 
(letter) and the spirit of prayer: 
  
Praying, conceived as an inner ritual 
service to God and hence as a means of 
grace, is a superstitious delusion (a 
fetish-making); for it only is the 
declaring of a wish to a being who has 
no need of any declaration regarding the 
inner disposition of the wisher, through 
which nothing is therefore accomplished 
nor is any of the duties incumbent on us 
as commands of God discharged; hence 
God is not really served. A sincere wish 
to please God in all our doings and 
nondoings, i.e. the disposition, 
accompanying all our actions, to pursue 
these as though they occurred in the 
service of God, is the spirit of prayer, 
and this can and ought to be in us 
“without ceasing” (Kant: “Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”, 
210). 
 
The first sentence is a clear condemnation of 
prayer.  But notice that Kant draws the 
distinction between the two types of prayer by 
calling to mind their purpose.  Prayer treated as 
though it, in itself, were pleasing to God 
accomplishes nothing.  However, prayer as a 
means to enhance our disposition toward God 
ought to be instilled in us.  So, Kant is not 
simply condemning all prayer, but only the false 
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interpretation of prayer by treating it as an ends 
in itself.  Prayer in the service of the moral 
imperative is actually something that we should 
all adopt.  The spirit of prayer, however, is not 
understood in the traditional sense of prayer 
(e.g. reciting “The Our Father” or other prayers) 
since, according to Kant, this would be a false 
interpretation.  Instead it is an internal 
disposition to want to please God through duty 
(action).  Thus prayer is only bad when it 
infringes on one’s moral growth.  Everything 
must be interpreted as being inferior to the 
moral element.  So, because of our natural need 
to seek an empirical element in the pure 
religion, the spirit of prayer becomes a useful 
element in helping us reach God’s end. 
 Despite prayers’ usefulness, Kant makes 
clear that prayer and other forms of ritual are 
often harmful to pure religion.  Historical faiths 
work against the true aim of God, because they 
claim to be the object of His end (Kant, 142).  
As evidence, these faiths provide revelation and 
scripture for which they offer their own 
interpretation.  Obviously this is false, Kant 
claims, because these revelations and scripture 
are not presented as certain and universal as the 
categorical imperatives are.  Thus the faiths are 
doing a disservice to humans by misrepresenting 
God’s aim. 
 In Kant’s view, the only way of 
incorporating revelation and scripture into the 
service of God is to interpret them such that 
they act as means towards the fulfillment of 
moral duty just as in the spirit of prayer.  
Revelation and scripture, then, would need to be 
reinterpreted since they clearly don’t all agree 
with Kant’s view on religion.  Kant 
acknowledges that “this interpretation may often 
appear to us as forced” (Kant, 142).  It is often 
forced because one must take a piece of work or 
experience and be sure to only extract moral 
principles from it where there may seem to be 
no moral principles in it at all.  Interpreting a 
piece of scripture or a revelation is usually for 
the purpose of reaching a greater understanding 
of what is at hand.  If what is being interpreted 
is already known, what is the point in 
interpreting it?  It certainly won’t enrich my 
understanding since I am imposing my 
understanding on it.  Nothing can be extracted.  
The same applies to prayer.  If one interprets 
prayer in terms of the moral imperative to arrive 
at the spirit of prayer which urges that I obey 
divine command, it’s already understood that 
one recognizes his or her duty to obey.  Now, it 
could be noted here that the moral imperative is 
translated into divine command through 
interpretation of prayer.  Here, prayer is serving 
to reassure one of God’s presence.  However, I 
believe that since the interpretation of divine 
command was derived from my preconceived 
notion of morality, the interpretation offers no 
fruitful understanding of pure religion which I 
did not already know.  At best, interpreting 
religious text only in terms of ethical duty or, as 
Kant calls, forced interpretation, changes the 
aesthetic of the moral law that we may hold in 
our heads.  However, as Kant makes very clear, 
we must be very cautious not to deface the 
imperative too much such that God’s end 
becomes skewed.  With this in mind, it would 
seem one would rather tread lightly by not 
shifting his understanding of the moral law at 
all. 
 Kant’s treatment of our natural need to 
manifest higher concepts empirically could 
make prayer or other rituals seem necessary, as 
if they were a formal requirement in actualizing 
ethical duty.  Palmquist interprets Kant in this 
way:  
 
Before God’s assistance can do any 
good, ‘man must first make himself 
worthy to receive it’ – and this 
worthiness refers not to ‘doing good 
deeds’ (a view often wrongly imputed to 
Kant) but  to fostering a receptivity 
for goodness in one’s disposition.  A 
person who prays to become worthy of 
God’s goodness is (or ought to be) 
conforming to this principle (Palmquist, 
595). 
 
I think this is a misreading of Kant.  Palmquist 
is suggesting that prayer suffices to satisfy the 
requirement that we must first be worthy of 
God’s power before we are able fulfill his 
commands.  Kant, though, does not think of our 
natural need as a necessity in the bounds of pure 
religion.  Instead, he is only accounting for 
3
Fricke: Kant on Prayer
Published by KnightScholar, 2011
138 
 
historical faith having a consistent presence in 
all human history.  So the natural need should 
be treated more as a psychological phenomenon 
than a necessity.  Kant acknowledges that there 
are those who choose to concern themselves 
with higher concepts (such as philosophers) and 
do not need prayer as a means to manifest the 
imperative.  Although prayer may satisfy some 
individuals' needs to experience the moral 
“ought”, Palmquist is mistaken in thinking that 
this need extends to all as a prerequisite to being 
worthy of God's power. 
 Although Kant endorses the usefulness 
of prayer in his theology where it might seem 
inconsistent, he never asserts it in a truly 
positive sense: prayer alone is not pleasing to 
God.  With this in mind, the two uses of prayer 
that Kant adumbrates, reassurance of God and 
an "extra" incentive towards fulfilling moral 
duties, are both valid and sound within his 
theology.  However, Kant's formal construction 
of true religion certainly doesn't seem to need 
prayer.  The forced interpretation that Kant calls 
for is problematic in that it may fulfill a need in 
the individual but it also brings that individual 
closer to misconstruing the moral law.  
Furthermore, the moral interpretation 
presupposes that the individual already knows 
the imperative well.  Limiting oneself to only 
one type of interpretation of scripture seems 
fruitless.  I think Kant preferred that all persons 
should try to resist this need, if they felt it, and 
simply adhere to the moral law that they 
discovered a priori.  Perhaps he was simply 
trying to appease some authority breathing 
down his neck.  It is also possible that Kant was 
bothered by the fact that history is so saturated 
by these religious doctrines.  He may have felt 
compelled to account for it some way in his 
philosophy so he deemed it a frailty of mankind.  
But it would seem that after reading Kant's 
theology and recognizing that our need to 
manifest God's aim was a fault, we would 
change our ways and pull away from any natural 
need.  Regardless, I think Kant acknowledges 
that ritualistic practices are an overall detriment 
to his moral religion but only chose to include 
them insofar as they have been such a common 
instrument throughout the course of history in 
all cultures. 
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